Cryptosystems based on codes in the rank metric were introduced in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramanov, and Tretjakov (GPT) and have been studied as a promising alternative to cryptosystems based on codes in the Hamming metric. In particular, it was observed that the combinatorial solution for solving the rank analogy of the syndrome decoding problem appears significantly harder. Early proposals were often made with an underlying Gabidulin code structure. Gibson, in 1995, made a promising attack which was later extended by Overbeck in 2008 to cryptanalyze many of the systems in the literature. Improved systems were then designed to resist the attack of Overbeck and yet continue to use Gabidulin codes. In this paper, we generalize Overbeck's attack to break the GPT cryptosystem for all possible parameter sets, and then generalize the attack to cryptanalyze particular variants which explicitly resist the attack of Overbeck.
Introduction
Cryptosystems based on the hardness of the general decoding problem have received much attention because of their applications to post-quantum cryptography. The practical implementation of these systems, however, has suffered from the drawback of having a large key size relative to RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Regardless, coding based cryptography remains one of the most feasible alternatives to traditional number theoretic cryptosystems for resisting quantum attacks such as Shor's factoring algorithm. A large body of work has been produced in the study of cryptography based on codes in the Hamming metric, starting with McEliece in 1978 [14] . It was observed that the cryptosystem he designed had efficient encryption and decryption procedures, however, the proposed public key sizes were significantly larger than keys for RSA or ECC, rendering the system infeasible in its original form.
The large size of the key in the McEliece cryptosystem is a consequence of the efficiency of combinatorial solutions to the general decoding problem for codes in the Hamming metric. The impetus for interest in codes in the rank metric were preliminary results concerning the rank syndrome decoding problem, in which the best algorithms were of significantly higher complexity [2, 16] . This indicated that cryptosystems could be designed with far smaller parameters than those in the Hamming metric. Cryptosystems based on codes in the rank metric were introduced earlier by Gabidulin, Paramonov, and Tretjakov (GPT) [5] . Since then, proposals for designs of cryptosystems have alternately been attacked and modified. The designs are often based on Gabidulin codes-the rank metric analogy of generalized Reed-Solomon codes-because of the scarcity of efficiently decodable codes in the rank metric. This has led to efficient structural attacks [9, 17] and subsequently improvements in the designs of these codes and their parameters [12, 4, 18, 13] . It should be noted that unlike the syndrome decoding problem in the Hamming metric, the rank syndrome decoding problem is not known to be NP-hard. Other related work has been done in improving algorithms for the rank syndrome decoding problem [7] , and also designing rank-metric based cryptosystems which do not rely on Gabidulin codes [8] .
The original GPT cryptosystem had its first significant attack by Gibson [9] . Following Gibson's lead, Overbeck proposed an alternative attack that led to a polynomial time break for many parameters of the GPT cryptosystem [17] . In the wake of these developments, two modifications, designed to use Gabidulin codes and yet resist the attack of Overbeck, stand out. They follow a similar idea -a more careful choice of distortion matrix -but have different approaches. The approach taken in [13] is based on enlarging the distortion matrix but restricting its rank, whereas the idea in [18] is based on careful design of the structure of the distortion matrix. While the ideas in these modifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive, an disadvantage of the former version is that it requires a large increase in the public key size in order to be secure against Overbeck's attack. A disadvantage of the latter version is that the distortion matrices must necessarily be quite structured.
In this paper we present a new attack which can be seen as a generalization of Overbeck's, and which allows us to cryptanalyze the systems presented in [18] and [13] . The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some terminology as well as the necessary background regarding rank metric codes and the GPT cryptosystem and its variants. Section 3 provides some basic results that we will need to describe our attack. In particular, we need some basic results about Moore matrices as well as the behavior of matrices under the coordinate-wise Frobenius map. Section 4 outlines the attack on the GPT cryptosystem and Section 5 uses the method to cryptanalyze the aforementioned variants.
Background
Let F ⊂ E be two fields with [E : F] = m. We will refer to the rank in the following ways. Given a matrix M with coefficients in E, we mean by the rank of M , the usual notion of the dimension of the row span of M as a vector space over E. We will denote the row span of a matrix M over E by M . By column rank (over F) of a matrix M with coefficients in E, we mean the rank of the column span of M as an F-vector space and we will denote this by colrk(M ). When we say the rank of a vector, x ∈ E n , we mean the F-rank of the matrix obtained by expanding x into an m × n matrix according to some basis of E over F. The rank defined in this way is invariant with respect to the choice of basis. An equivalent way to express the rank of a vector x ∈ E n is to take the dimension over F of the subspace of E which is spanned by the coordinates of x.
If we are working over a base field F = F q of cardinality q, and an extension field E = F q m , then we denote by [i] the ith Frobenius power, q i . The Frobenius map can be applied to a matrix or vector coordinate-wise.
Definition 2.1. The rank distance between x, y ∈ F n q m is defined to be
This defines a metric on F n q m . If V is a subspace of F q m , the minimum rank distance of V is given by d
We will also use the term weight of x, denoted by wt R (x), to mean d R (x, 0).
The Singleton bound for (linear) rank-metric codes is given by the inequality (see e.g.
Definition 2.2. A rank-metric code meeting the Singleton bound is called a maximum rank-distance (MRD) code.
The linear isometries of F n q m with respect to the rank metric are given by (F * q m ) × GL n (F q ) [1] . Throughout the paper we will make extensive use of the coordinate-wise Frobenius map. This map is a semi-linear isometry of the rank-metric with many useful properties. For more information on semi-linear isometries, see [15] .
In the following lemma, we will summarize some of the important properties of Moore matrices. These results are known or are direct consequences of known results. 1. If k ≤ n, then M has dimension k, and minimum rank distance n − k + 1.
If
3. If A ∈ F k×N q m is another Moore matrix then M +A is also a Moore matrix. Moreover, if the column rank of A is equal to r < n − k + 1, then the minimum rank distance of M + A is at least n − k + 1 − r.
If the minimum rank distance of
M is d > 1, then the minimum rank distance of M + M ([1]) is equal to d − 1.
is a full rank matrix, then M E is a Moore matrix and the minimum rank distance of M E = M E is at least d − s.
Proof.
1. The case n = N is given in Theorems 6 and 7 of [3] . Thus we know that, if N > n, we can puncture the vector space M to get a space M ′ of length n, dimension k and minimum rank distance n − k + 1. Hence the minimum rank distance of M is at least n − k + 1. That it cannot be greater follows from Lemma 4.7 of [11] .
2. The first statement follows easily from the Moore matrix structure. This implies that
3. The first statement follows from the fact that (x+y
for any x, y ∈ F q m . Therefore the Moore structure is preserved under addition of matrices. For the second part note that any element a ∈ A has rank at most r and any non-zero element m i ∈ M has rank at least n − k + 1. Hence a can change the rank of m ± a by at most r, i.e. the rank of any non-zero element of M + A has rank at least n − k + 1 − r.
Since the minimum rank distance of
is an isometry, and so G[E | E ′ ] has minimum rank distance d. Removing the last s columns gives GE , which can only decrease the rank by at most s.
A well-known class of codes in the rank metric are the Gabidulin codes [3] . Gabidulin codes are those whose generator matrix is a Moore matrix in which the generating vector has full rank: Definition 2.5. Fix k ≤ n ≤ m, and let α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ F n q m , rk(α) = n. The Gabidulin code of length n and dimension k over F q m , denoted by Gab n,k (α) is given by the row space of the matrix,
From Lemma 2.4, we have that Gabidulin codes are MRD codes. Moreover, they have efficient decoding algorithms [20, 21, 3] . Gabidulin codes are also closed under the linear isometries of the rank-metric (for isometries of rank-metric codes see e.g. [1, 15] ). Specifically, if β ∈ F * q m and σ ∈ GL n (F q ), then βGab n,k (α)σ = Gab n,k (βασ).
Decoding From an Arbitrary Generator Matrix
McEliece cryptosystems based on Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes were effectively broken by Sidel'nikov-Shestakov [19] . Their attack allows one to recover the generating vector of a GRS code, and therefore a decoding algorithm. Similarly, in the case of Gabidulin codes, a decoding algorithm can be found if one knows the canonical generator matrix of the code. Using a simple method, we can also recover a decoding algorithm if the generator matrix is not in canonical form, as described in the following. Consider the Gabidulin code Gab n,k (α) with dimension 1 < k < n and generator matrix SG, where S ∈ GL k (F q m ) and G of the form (1) Lemma 2.4) . Iterating with this new Gabidulin code, we can eventually obtain a code of dimension 1, which is generated by α ([k−1]) . If we take some non-zero element of this space, it has the form βα ([k−1]) , for some β ∈ F q m . Applying the Frobenius map coordinate-wise m − k + 1 times, we obtain an element of the form β [m−k+1] α. Using this element, we can construct a generator matrix, BG, for Gab n,k (α) which will have the form
The change of basis from SG to BG is then given by BS −1 . For a message m ∈ F k q m , encoded as mSG, we can now decode with respect to Gab n,k (β [m−k+1] α) to obtain mSB −1 . Then, applying BS −1 , we can recover m.
GPT and GGPT Cryptosystems
Let S ∈ GL k (F q m ), G ∈ F k×n q m be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, say Gab n,k (α), capable of correcting t ′ errors, and X ∈ F k×n q m be a matrix of column rank t < t ′ . We define
We call a GPT cryptosystem one in which the public key is given by the pair
and the private key is given by
An encryption of a message m ∈ F k q m is given by
where e ∈ F n q m is a randomly chosen vector of rank at most t ′ − t. The product mS can be recovered from a decoding algorithm for Gab n,k (α) because all elements of X have weight at most t. Specifically, if wt R (e) ≤ t ′ − t,
Inverting S, the message m can then be recovered. We will call the elements of the form mX the designed error associated with the encryption of m, and X the designed error matrix.
In [18, 13] the authors consider an alternative version which we call the generalized GPT (GGPT) cryptosystem. This system uses a public matrix of the form
where G is as before, X ∈ F k×t q m is a matrix of column rankt, S ∈ GL k (F q m ), and σ ∈ GL n+t (F q ). The public key is given by
and the private key is given by κ pvt = (G, S, σ).
In the GGPT cryptosystem, an encryption of m ∈ F k q m is given by
with rk(e) ≤ t ′ . To recover m, one first computes
and then ignores the firstt coordinates. Decoding the last n coordinates with respect to Gab n,k (α), one obtains mS, and by applying S −1 , the message m can be recovered.
Overbeck's Attack
We will describe Overbeck's attack from [17] for the case of the GGPT cryptosystem; the attack for the GPT case is analogous. Let G ∈ F k×n q m be a generator matrix for the Gabidulin code, Gab n,k (α). The first step in Overbeck's attack is to consider the extended matrix (for some u ≥ 1)
. . .
. . . . . .
Since the n right-most columns of G ext σ −1 span the Gabidulin code Gab k+u (α), the matrix can be brought into the form of
by some suitable row transformation, where
is a generator matrix of Gab k+u (α), and X * * ∈ F
With this information one can reconstruct the code Gab n,k (α) and recover the encrypted message.
In the case when X * * does not have full rank, Overbeck's attack fails, since Gab n,k (α) cannot be reconstructed from the dual of G ext ⊥ . This is why, in [13] , Loidreau suggests to use a randomly chosen X of low rank, a, since then the rank of X * * can be bounded above. Specifically, to resist Overbeck's attack, one should chooset > (n − k)a. However, this would drastically increase the key size of the cryptosystem. To avoid this problem of large key size, the Smart Approach considered in [18] , is to design X in a structured way so that X * * is rank-deficient, without necessarily having to increaset. However the structure of X makes the Smart Approach more vulnerable to attacks. A more detailed description of these two systems is given in Section 5.
Preliminary Results
In this section, we show that one can decompose a matrix (or vector) of low column rank into the product of two matrices, one of which has full column rank, and the other with elements restricted to F q . Moreover, we prove some results about the coordinate-wise Frobenius map, as well as the structure of the designed error matrix, which we will need later on in our attack.
We will denote by M t×n,r (F q ) the set of t × n matrices over F q with rank r. The sphere around the origin of rank radius t in F n q m will be denoted by
where M t×n,t (F q )/GL t (F q ) is the set of equivalence classes of t × n matrices over F q of rank t, where two matrices are equivalent if they have the same row span.
Proof. As representatives of the cosets in M t×n (F q )/GL t (F q ) we consider the reduced row echelon form of the respective row span of the elements of the coset. Define the map
We now show that ϕ is bijective.
We first show that ϕ is surjective. For this consider an arbitrary element in the image of ϕ, i.e. a vector x ∈ F n q m of rank t, and let x i 1 , . . . , x it be the first t independent entries of x, in positions i 1 , . . . , i t . Then, the remaining n − t entries of x can be expressed as an F q -linear combination of x i 1 , . . . , x it , thus we can write
To show injectivity, suppose that there are two preimages, i.e.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that U = [I t | * ]. Denote by U ′ j the jth column of U ′ . Then we have
Since v has rank t, U ′ 1 , . . . , U ′ t must be non-zero. Because U ′ is in reduced row echelon form, we get U ′ = [I t | * ] and hence
We furthermore have
Since rk(v) = t, we get U j − U ′ j = 0 for j = t + 1, . . . , n. Thus U = U ′ and we have shown that ϕ is injective.
One can think of the space M t×n,t (F q )/GL t (F q ) as a set of matrices parameterizing the Grassmannian Gr(t, F n q ), i.e. the space of t-dimensional subspaces of F n q . According to the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can express a vector x of rank t as x =xU for any matrix representation U of a certain element of the Grassmannian Gr(t, F n q ). We can easily extend the result of Proposition 3.1 from vectors of rank t to matrices of column rank t. Then we get the following result. 
Definition 3.3. Let X ∈ F k×n q m be a matrix of rank k and column rank t and V ∈ F k×t q m , U ∈ F t×n q such that X = V U . We call U the Grassmann support of X which will be denoted by U = supp Gr (X). By abuse of notation we will also call any matrix representation U ∈ F t×n q of this space the Grassmann support of X. Proof. Let U ∈ F t×n q be the Grassmann support of X. By Corollary 3.2, we can write X = V U for some V ∈ F k×t q m . Thus every row of X is a F q m -linear combination of the rows of U , which implies that X ⊆ U . Since dim( U ) = t and dim( X ) = k, we get equality if and only if k = t.
The following two lemmas are needed to prove the main results of this section in Theorems 3.7 and 3.10.
Lemma 3.5. Let X ∈ F k×n q m be a matrix of column rank t and S ∈ GL k (F q m ). Then, SX also has column rank t.
Proof. Denote the ith column of X by X i . Assume that SX has column rank less than t, i.e. for any i 1 < · · · < i t ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exist a 1 , . . . , a t ∈ F q such that
This is a contradiction to the fact that the column rank of X is t.
The following properties of the coordinate-wise Frobenius map will be used throughout the paper. The first statement follows straightforwardly from the F q -linearity of the Frobenius map, the second and the third are known and can be found, for instance, in [10, 11] . Lemma 3.6. The following hold for any prime power q and 0 < n ≤ m.
1. Let x ∈ F n q m have rank r. Then, x (q) also has rank r.
Let
3. Let S ⊂ F n q m be an F q m -subspace. Then, S (q) = S if and only if S has a basis contained in F n q .
We saw in Lemma 3.4 that if a matrix X, with Grassmann support U , has column rank which is greater than its rank, then X U . The following theorem shows that we can use the Frobenius map to recover U from X. Theorem 3.7. Let X ∈ F k×n q m be a matrix of column rank s. Then, for any ℓ ≥ 0,
In particular,
Proof. The chain of subspaces
must eventually stabilize. Let ℓ be such that,
Define
. We have
= s ′ . Hence, we must have
and therefore we can use the third point of Lemma 3.6 and express the sum on the right as the row space of a matrix U ′ ∈ F s ′ ×n q of (column) rank s ′ . Thus there exists
This implies that X ⊆ U ′ . It follows from Proposition 3.1 that s ′ ≥ s. Moreover, by Lemma 3.5, the above matrix on the left has column rank s ′ . Since, by the F q -linearity of the Frobenius, the column rank of this matrix is equal to the column rank of X we get s = s ′ and hence supp Gr (X) = U ′ .
Note that a matrix X ∈ F n q m can always be decomposed into a Moore matrix component X Moore and a non-Moore matrix component Z as
Definition 3.8. We will call such a decomposition a Moore decomposition. There exists a Moore decomposition so that the non-Moore component has lowest possible column rank. In this case, we call the Moore decomposition a minimum column rank Moore decomposition.
Proposition 3.9 shows that, regardless of the choice of Moore decomposition, the Grassmann support of a non-Moore matrix component of a minimum column rank Moore decomposition is the same. Proof. Let A have Grassmann support U , and B have Grassmann support V . I.e., we can write A = A ′ U and B = B ′ V with U, V ∈ F s×n q of full rank. Let E ∈ F (n−s)×n q be a parity check matrix for V . Then,
Since E is a matrix over F q , (B Moore − A Moore )E T is a Moore matrix, therefore the matrix AE T must be a Moore matrix as well. This gives that (AE
E T for i = 2, . . . , k. Since A itself is not necessarily a Moore matrix, row i of A must be of the form A i ∈ A
+ ker(E), for i = 1, . . . , k. Then, we can write
be a parity check matrix for U , then AF T = A ′ U F T = 0 and hence in particular A 1 F T = 0. Since F is a matrix over F q , we also get A
Since X = (A Moore +Ā) + κ ′ V is also a Moore decomposition of X, then the column rank of κ ′ V must be equal to s and so V = κ ′ V . Thus,
and therefore, V = U , so the Grassmann supports of A and B are the same. 
Proof. Let U ∈ F s×n q be the Grassmann support of X. Moreover, let X i , M i denote the ith row of X and M respectively, and let
Then the space
is generated by the row span of 
for a suitable row transformation matrixS. Since U ∈ F s×n q we have U ([i]) = U for i ≥ 0. It follows that the rows of X ′ are elements of U , which implies that the Grassmann support U ′ of X ′ is a subspace of U and hence that X ′ has column rank s ′ ≤ s. By Theorem 3.7,
We now want to show that U ′ = U . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the rank of U ′ is strictly smaller than s. We write X as a Moore decomposition
We note that X i+1 − X [1] i ∈ U ′ for i = 1, ..., k − 1. Starting from the first non-zero row of X ′′ , it follows that
We recognize this as the second non-zero row of X ′′ . Continuing in this fashion, we can obtain that every row of X ′′ must belong to U ′ . Hence, X ′′ has column rank at most s ′ < s. However, this contradicts the fact that the minimal column rank Moore decomposition has non-Moore part with column rank s. Therefore, by Proposition 3.9, U ′ has rank s and we have U ′ = U . Hence, we have shown that the row space of the second matrix in (9) is equal to the row space of M * + X * U which is in turn equal to the row space of
because we can cancel X * by taking suitable elements of U , since X * ⊆ U ′ = U . This implies the statement. 
In particular, colrk(X Moore ) ≤ colrk(X).
Proof. Define ℓ := max(colrk(X), colrk(X Moore )). Using Theorems 3.7 and 3.10, we have
Corollary 3.12. Let M ∈ F k×N q m be a Moore matrix and X be of column rank t with minimum column rank Moore decomposition X = X Moore + Z, where colrk(Z) = s.
Then, all elements of rank one in
belong to supp Gr (X). Moreover, if s = t, the elements of rank one exactly span supp Gr (X) = supp Gr (Z).
Proof. Let U be the subspace spanned by all elements of rank one in
From Lemma 3.11, if X = X Moore + Z, is a minimum column rank decomposition, then we know that supp Gr (Z) ⊆ supp Gr (X). Let H ∈ F (n−t)×n q be parity check matrix for supp Gr (X). From Lemma 2.4, we have
Since H is a matrix over F q , we get wt R (x) ≤ wt R (xH), and therefore we must have that U ⊆ supp Gr (X). By Theorem 3.10, supp Gr (Z) ⊆ U and if s = t then supp Gr (Z) = supp Gr (X). Therefore we have supp Gr (Z) = U = supp Gr (X).
To set up our attack in Section 4, we need to find the elements of rank one in a linear rank metric code efficiently. To accomplish this, we only need to find the codewords that have all coordinates in F q (all other rank one codewords are multiples of these). The following lemma shows how these codewords in F n q can be computed.
Lemma 3.13. Let G ∈ F k×n q m be in reduced row echelon form and denote by G i the i-th row of G. Then the solutions to
for variables a i ∈ F q , represent the codewords of G in F n q .
Proof. Any codeword can be written as an F q m -linear combination of the rows of G.
Since all rows of G have their pivot equal to 1, a codeword with entries only in F q needs to be an F q -linear combination of the rows. Thus, we get that any codeword in F n q can be written as
When expanded over F q , Equation (10) gives rise to a linear system of equations with k variables, which can efficiently be solved with standard methods.
Cryptanalysis of the GPT Cryptosystem
In this section we explain our new attack to break the GPT cryptosystem, as defined in Subsection 2.2. Our attack extends Overbeck's attack to cryptanalyze the system for all parameters. In Section 5, we show how this same idea can be used to cryptanalyze the GGPT variant.
Recall that the public key generator matrix is of the form
where G is a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code Gab n,k (α), X ∈ F k×n q m is a matrix of column rank t, and S ∈ GL k (F q m ).
Note that, as an attacker, we do not have a priori knowledge of the parameter s (the column rank of the non-Moore part in the minimal column rank Moore decomposition of X). We can generally assume s = t, or else start with s = 1 and increase the value up to t until the attack succeeds. Proof. Let H ∈ F (n−s ′ )×n q be a parity check matrix for U . Applying H to the public key generator matrix yields
From Lemma 3.11 we know that colrk(X Moore ) ≤ t. Then, from Lemma 2.4, it follows that G + X Moore has minimum rank distance at least n − k + 1 − t, and that G + X Moore H T has minimum rank distance at least n − k
From the minimum distance we know that there are n − (t + s ′ ) independent columns in this matrix, which generate a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n − (t + s ′ ) − k + 1,
. From Subsection 2.1, we can recover a decoding algorithm for Gab n−(t+s ′ ),k (γ) with respect to the submatrix formed by these n − (t + s ′ ) columns. The error correction capability of Gab n−(t+s
where the last inequality follows from the fact that H is a matrix over F q . For an encrypted message m(SG + X) + e, we have
When we restrict this to the above chosen independent columns, we can uniquely decode in the respective code Gab n−(t+s ′ ),k (γ) and can therefore recover m.
We can now use the previous result to attack and break the GPT cryptosystem.
Corollary 4.2. Consider a GPT cryptosystem as defined in Subsection 2.2 with public key generator matrix
For any such cryptosystem, an encrypted message can be recovered in polynomial time.
Proof. As before, let S −1 X = X Moore + Z be a minimal column rank Moore decomposition. Denote by s the column rank of Z. We first note that
By Corollary 3.12, all the elements of rank one in
belong to the Grassmann support of X. With Lemma 3.13 we can find a basis matrix U ∈ F s ′ ×n q for these elements of rank one in polynomial time. We have U ⊆ supp Gr (X). On the other hand, by Theorem 3.10, supp Gr (Z) ⊆ s i=0 G + X ([i]) . Thus, we also have supp Gr (Z) ⊆ U . Therefore we can use Theorem 4.1 to recover the encrypted message.
Cryptanalysis of GGPT Variants
In this section we adapt our attack to break the GGPT cryptosystem, as defined in Subsection 2.2. To do so we will consider two variants of the GGPT separately. However, in both subsections we will consider a public key generator matrix of the form
where G is a generator matrix of some Gabidulin code Gab n,k (α), X ∈ F k×t q m is a matrix of column rankt, S ∈ GL k (F q m ), and σ ∈ GL n+t (F q ).
Smart Approach Variant
Recall from Subection 2.3 that we can put the extended matrix into the form
Rashwan et al. in [18] proposed what they call the Smart Approach (SA). In this setting, they note that if X ∈ F k×t q m is constructed from a Moore matrix of column rank a and a non-Moore component of column rankt − a, then X * * will have rankt − a. The paper gives no suggestions for design parameters of such a system. However, one implicit advantage of this construction is the ability to predict the rank of X * * , and therefore to be able to reduce the public key by choosing a smaller designed error matrix.
In the SA variant we can write X = X Moore + Z as a minimal column rank Moore decomposition, where X Moore has column rank a and Z has column rankt − a. We can then rewriteĜ
X ′ is a matrix of column rankt − a and S −1 M is a Moore matrix generating a code with minimum rank distance at least n − k + 1.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a GGPT cryptosystem as defined above. Suppose an adversary can find a matrix
. Then an encrypted message from a public key of the form (5) can be recovered in polynomial time.
Proof. We note that U ′ must be of the form U ′ = [U | 0]σ, where U ∈ F (t−a)×t q is such that supp Gr (Z) = U . Let H U ∈ F a×t q be a parity check matrix for U . A parity check matrix H U ′ ∈ F (a+n)×(t+n) q for U ′ must be of the form
for some A ∈ GL n+a (F q ). We computeĜ
A is again a Moore matrix, generating a code of minimum distance at least n−k +1. Hence, we can find n independent columns ofĜ pub (H U ′ ) T which will form a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n − k + 1. Denote these columns by i = (i 1 , . . . i n ) and the corresponding submatrix by G i . From Section 2.1, we can recover a decoding algorithm for G i with respect to G i .
We note that if e is an error of rank at most t ′ , and we denote by e ′ the subvector of e(H U ′ ) T corresponding to columns i, then
If we apply H U ′ to an encrypted message of the form mĜ pub + e, we obtain
Restricting to the coordinates i, we obtain
which we can decode in the code G i to recover m, since the error correction capability of G i is t ′ ≥ rk(e ′ ).
Corollary 5.2. Consider a GGPT cryptosystem as defined above. If
we can recover an encrypted message in polynomial time.
Proof. Recall thatĜ
is a minimum column rank Moore decomposition. Then S −1Ĝ pub = S −1 M + S −1 X ′ is also a minimal column rank Moore decomposition. S −1 M is a Moore matrix generating a code of minimum rank distance at least n − k + 1. Since, by the condition of this corollary,
it follows from Corollary 3.12 that all elements of rank one in
span the space supp Gr (X ′ ) = supp Gr ([Z | 0]σ). We can use Lemma 3.13 to find these elements of rank one, and obtain U ′ ∈ F (t−a)×(t+n) q such that U ′ = supp Gr (X ′ ). Then we can use Theorem 5.1 to recover the message.
The following example illustrates a case when Overbeck's attack fails, but our attack recovers the encrypted message.
Example 5.3. Let q = 2, n = 8, k = 3,t = 3, a = 1 and g 1 , . . . , g 8 ∈ F 2 8 linearly independent over F 2 . Consider the generator matrix of a Gabidulin code
and, for some x ∈ F 2 8 \F 2 , the matrices
and the public key generator matrix bê
For simplicity we let S = I 3 and σ = I 11 . We choose u = 1 and construct G ext , which can be put in the form 
Loidreau's GGPT Variant
As already mentioned in Subsection 2.3, in Loidreau's GGPT variant [13] the designed error matrix, X ∈ F k×t q m , is a randomly chosen matrix of rank a <t/(n − k). We can assume that X has column rankt. In this case, to find the Grassmann support of X with the help of Theorem 3.7, we need to go up to the (t − 1)-st Frobenius power. But, sincet
we get thatt
hence the elements of rank one cannot help us reconstruct the Grassmann support of X. Thus the attack of Subsection 5.1 would not succeed. However, in this case, we can still use the idea of locating the elements of rank one; but now we want to recover the elements of the Gabidulin part of the code, instead of the Grassmann support of X. The strategy is effectively the same, although we must make some assumptions on the behavior of X and random subcodes of Gabidulin codes.
First, we note that there is a suitable row transformation, T , so that
where X * ∈ F a×t q m is a matrix with the same row span as X, and G * and G * * are matrices which span subcodes of G . One can easily see that [X * | G * ]σ and [0 | G * * ]σ intersect trivially. Our strategy will be to use the purely Gabidulin part [0 | G * * ] to generate a parity check matrix for [X * | 0].
We will now state the assumptions that we will use in our attack. These assumptions are justified with experimental results in Table 1 . 
With high probability, we have
m n k at Assumption The value of ℓ in (13) is the smallest possible value for which we can obtain equality in (14) . One could choose ℓ larger than in (13), which we will remark on in the end of this section.
Since we can expect a random matrix whose rank is small relative to the dimension of the ambient space to not contain elements of rank one, we make the additional assumption:
Assumption 2. Let X ∈ F k×t q m be a random matrix of rank a. For ℓ given in (13), if ℓa ≪t, then with high probability,
contains no elements of rank one. 
If Assumptions 1 and 2 are true, then we can break the Loidreau GGPT variant in polynomial time with high probability.
Proof. Let ℓ be as in (13) and TĜ pub as in (12) . Consider the matrix
Since G * * is a subcode of G of codimension a, by Assumption 1, we have with high probability,
Then, the bottom submatrix ofḠ has the same row span as [0 | I n ], and hence, by using elementary operations, we can eliminate the second component of every row in the top submatrix ofḠ. Then, the space generated by the rows of G ′′ ext is the same as that generated by We can find the matrix V by observing that
This gives a linear system of equations witht(n +t) variables and k ×t equations over F q m . Since the variables can only take values in F q , we can expand each equation into m equations over F q , obtaining a system of kmt equations andt(n +t) variables over F q . Hence, we can solve this system of equations if km ≥ n +t (which is always satisfied).
Let H V ∈ F n×(n+t) q m be any dual matrix for V . Then, H V has the form
for some B ∈ GL n (F q ). Therefore,
is a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n − k + 1, from which we can recover a decoding algorithm, as explained in Subsection 2. we can recover the encrypted message, m, from the recovered decoding algorithm with respect to SGB. All the operations required for this attack can be performed in polynomial time.
We will conclude this section with an example where we analyze our attack against the parameters proposed by Loidreau in [13] in order to resist Overbeck's attack. It turns out that the proposed parameters are not secure against our attack.
Example 5.5. Consider a Loidreau GGPT variant with q = 2, m = n = 24, k = 12, a = 3, andt = 40, i.e. the first set of parameters from Table 1 . Assume we, as an attacker, know the public generator matrixĜ pub ∈ F and received an encrypted message y. We compute ℓ = ⌈ This requires on the order of 2 39 operations over F 2 . Implementing the algorithm on a personal computer, we were able to break this system very efficiently.
For the parameters in the second row of the table, we can similarly break the system, albeit with slightly higher complexity due the larger parameters.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a new attack against cryptosystems based on Gabidulin codes, reconfirming that Gabidulin based cryptosystems are vulnerable from a structural perspective. Our attack generalizes Overbeck's attack, focusing instead on recovering the elements of rank one, rather than the structure of the dual space. One principle advantage of our attack is that it can be extended to cryptanalyze certain variants of the generalized GPT system, which resist the original attacks of Gibson and Overbeck. In particular, we show that the Smart Approach and Loidreau's GGPT variants are vulnerable to this attack.
To the best of the authors' knowledge, attacking a cryptosystem by looking at the elements of rank one is a new approach which may need to be considered for the security of existing and future rank-metric based cryptosystems. As a next step the authors want to use this idea of finding elements of rank one to cryptanalyze the column scrambler variant of [6] , which has so far resisted structural attacks.
